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Abstract
We study incentives for innovations that enable rms to enter backward into the input
market. Such innovations are disruptive in that they lead to structural changes and even reversal
of supply-customer relationships. We rst show that Arrows replacement e¤ect is also present
in our vertical setting which gives rise to two general results: (1) vertical integration lowers the
R&D incentive of the integrated downstream rm; and (2) vertical integration raises the R&D
incentive of the non-integrated downstream rm. We then identify, respectively, situations for
strategic integration, which is driven by the motive to preempt R&D of the target rm, and for
strategic separation, which occurs as a means to not trigger R&D by the downstream rival. An
otherwise protable raising rivals cost strategy may not be chosen for fear of counterattack by
the rival in the form of disruptive R&D.
Keywords: innovation, structural change, replacement e¤ect.
JEL Code: L13, L42, O31
1 Introduction
There are many real-life situations where downstream producers in vertically related industries
enter backward into the upstream market as a result of internal R&D or by acquiring independent
innovating rms. For example, Apple Inc. had once discussed acquiring Imagination, a major
supplier of graphics processors to the iPhone, but nally decided to take development of graphics
design in-house in order to reduce its future reliance on Imaginations technology.12 On the software
side, Apple had recently launched the mobile payment system Apple Pay, which is viewed by many
as posing a direct competition threat to the incumbent Paypal, the dominant leader in on-line
payment services.3Another case in point is that of Dell, which in 2012 created its software division,
Lin (corresponding author): plin@ln.edu.hk, Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, New
Territories, Hong Kong. Zhang: tianlezhang@ln.edu.hk, Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun,
New Territories, Hong Kong. Zhou: wzhou@business.hku.hk, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of
Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. We would like to thank Yongmin Chen, Avinash Dixit, Richard Gilbert,
Patrick Rey, Tom Ross and participants at the International IO Conference at Zhejiang University and the Anti-
Monopoly and Competition Policy Conference at Renmin University for their helpful comments and suggestions. All
errors remain our own.
1The Apple discount, Financial Times, April 8, 2017; https://www.ft.com/content/3d49b76a-1b76-11e7-a266-
12672483791a
2Similarly, Apple had relied on its main competitor Samsung for the production of chips used in the iPhone and
iPad, and was actively developing its own chips in alliance with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.
3Apple Pay, linked with existing credit cards such as Visa, Mastercard and UnionPay, enables customers to make
payments on their mobile phones at the point of sales in physical stores. See, e.g., Apple Pay Takes on Paypal with
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Dell Software Group, based on a series of acquisitions that enabled Dell to enter into software and
services businesses.45 What a¤ects rm incentive for innovation in a related (upstream) market?
What are the e¤ects of such potentially disruptive R&D based entry on existing rms in the related
market? What competitive strategies might be available for a¤ected rms to defend themselves
against such threats?
In this paper, we study the R&D incentives of downstream rms for innovations that enable
them to enter backward into the upstream market (a type of cross-market R&D). In our model, two
downstream rms produce di¤erentiated products initially using an input supplied by an upstream
monopolist. We consider mostly the case where only the downstream rms can conduct R&D
which when successful results in a new input of a higher quality, or equivalently at a lower cost,
and enables the innovating rm to enter the upstream market. A central feature of our model is
the structural changes associated with post-R&D entry into the upstream sector and exit of the
incumbent supplier if the innovation is drastic (which some would argue is the case for Apply Pay
and PayPal). Incentives are measured by the willingness to pay for the new input.6
We rst consider the case where the market structure is exogenously given as one of two
types: vertical separation, whereby all three rms are independent entities, and vertical integration,
whereby the upstream rm is merged with one of the two downstream rms. Our rst set of results
show that the downstream rms R&D incentive is stronger if it is a separate rm than if it is
integrated with the upstream incumbent supplier. Hence, vertical integration reduces the target
downstream rms R&D incentive for developing new input. The results also show that vertical
integration increases the R&D incentive of the competitor of the acquired downstream rm. These
results hold for general demand functions, regardless of whether the innovation is drastic, and under
both Cournot and Bertrand competition downstream.
The driving force for these results is the replacement e¤ect of innovation identied by Arrow
(1962) and the extensive studies in the literature on horizontal innovations, which says that a rms
R&D incentive is inversely related to its pre-innovation prot (see, e.g., Tirole 1998; Reinganum
1989; Gilbert 2006a and 2006b). If integrated with the current upstream supplier, the downstreams
innovation on new input simply replaces its upstream units current business, whereas the innovation
rm is not concerned with replacing the upstream input supply under vertical separation. Similarly,
integration between the upstream incumbent and a downstream rm hurts its downstream rival
because the latter faces a cost disadvantage with the integrated rm in the downstream market.
This decline in the pre-R&D prot for the non-integrating downstream rm induces it to invest
more in R&D that leads to not only self-su¢ ciency in the rms input supply, but also enables
Long-awaited Functions on Websites,Financial Review, 13 June, 2016; http://www.afr.com/technology/technology-
companies/apple/apple-pay-takes-on-paypal-with-longawaited-function-for-websites-20160613-gpia4f.
4Dell changes focus from hardware to software, services, Dallas Business Journal, Aug 7, 2013. Since its creation,
Dell Software Group has introduced many new products, including its Operating System 10 (OS10) which is based
on a native, unmodied Linux kernel that can support a broad range of applications and services from the Linux
ecosystem. S10 represents an interesting new direction for Dell as it continues to extend and enhance its networking
portfolio with innovations in software and hardware,said Brad Casemore, Research Director, Datacenter Networks,
IDC. Press Release, Dell, January 20, 2016. http://www/dell/com/learn/us/en/vn/press-releases/2016-01-20-dell-
raises-the-bar-for-open-networking.
5Other examples include that of China South Rail Corporation, which in 2015 successfully developed its own
technology for producing the Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor, a core component in high-speed train system that
used to be imported from more advanced countries. Toyota has developed a way to make hybrid and electric vehicles
without the use of expensive rare earth metals that had to be imported from China.
6This covers the cases where a downstream rm enters backward into the upstream market by acquiring an R&D
rm, as is the case of Dell Software Group.
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the rm to enter into the upstream market and drive the integrated rm out of the input business
(which we call the relationship-reversal e¤ect).
These general results enable us to further consider strategic incentives on the part of the up-
stream incumbent for vertical integration. We show that for certain R&D projects (to be conducted
by a downstream target rm or its competitor) (1) the incumbent input supplier can use vertical
integration to preempt disruptive input R&D by its target rm, which welfare is likely to decline;
and (2) under some other circumstances it pays the incumbent upstream rm to not vertically
merge with its target rm, so as to prevent input R&D (and the aftermentioned relationship re-
versal e¤ect) by the other downstream rm; Put di¤erently, an otherwise protable raising rivals
cost strategy (namely, vertical integration) is not chosen in our model for fear that so doing would
invite counterattack by the rival in the form of disruptive innovation. The policy implication of
result (1) is that authorities should be aware of the R&D related preemptive motive for vertical
mergers. Regarding result (2), the traditional removal of double marginalization incentive for ver-
tical integration, which is very strong in our model as in most vertical settings, is outweighed by
the fear of the otherwise disruptive input innovation by a downstream rival.
We also consider the case of R&D competition where both the downstream rms in our model
can conduct R&D. A rms success rate increases with its R&D investment; if both rms succeed,
each rm receives the patent with equal probability. Here, each rm has two incentives to innovate:
a standalone incentive (as considered in the early parts of the paper) and a competitive incentive
(given that its rival succeeds). We nd that the conclusion remains the same: for both drastic
and non-drastic innovations, vertical integration reduces the equilibrium R&D investment of the
integrated rm and raises that of the non-integrated rm. In addition, the strategic incentives for
vertical integration and separation, as identied previously, also exist under R&D competition.7
Stimulated by the arguments of Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) on the relationship be-
tween market structure and rmsR&D incentives, economists have devoted much attention to
innovation in the past several decades. The central question is whether market power enhances or
hurts innovation. However, most of the vast literature focuses on horizontal settings. Innovations
that enable rms to enter another tier of the vertical industry, e.g., backward to the input produc-
ing sector, have received little attention. Our paper is among the rst attempts to study incentives
for potentially disruptive R&D that lead to entry into the upstream market, and to show that the
replacement e¤ect identied by Arrow (1962) also exits along vertical businesses of an integrated
rm.
This may be viewed as supplementing the Arrownian counter-argument to the traditional
Schumpeterian view that larger rms are more innovative. Most of the studies mentioned so far
are conducted in a horizontal setting. Among the few studies of R&D in vertical settings, Chen
and Sappington (2010) examine the e¤ect of vertical structure on process innovation conducted
by upstream suppliers. They show that vertical integration generally enhances innovation when
the downstream competition is Cournot, but can dampen it if the competition is Bertrand. The
major force is that the upstream rm internalises the positive externality of its R&D investment
under V I. Our paper considers R&D by downstream rms that lead to entry to the other level
7 In the Appendix B, we consider the pure innovation incentive by the upstream rm to develop the new input. We
show that, for a linear demand, the upstream rm has a greater incentive to innovate under vertical integration than
under vertical separation. Unlike the case of downstream innovation, upstream R&D is not disruptive in that the
market structure remains unchanged following innovation. Thus, for upstream R&D, there is no structural benet
to the innovator. As the upstream rm innovates, the input price goes down which benets both downstream rms.
This positive externality is partially internalised under vertical integration but not under vertical separation.
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of the industry and thus structural change, and we also study strategic incentives for vertical
integration/separation, both of which are absent in Chen and Sappingtons study.
In a recent paper, Loertscher and Riordan (2014) consider a procurement model with com-
peting upstream rms that invest in process R&D and a monopolist downstream rm that can
source internally by vertical integration. The authors show that vertical integration discourages
cost-reducing investments of independent upstream suppliers by creating a favoured, internal source
of supply. As a result, vertical integration in their model, while increasing the R&D incentive of the
integrated supplier, decreases such incentive of the non-integrated suppliers, which is detrimental
to the monopoly customer. Loertscher and Riordan (2014) show that it may pay the monopoly
customer to remain vertically separate so as to encourage innovation by upstream suppliers. Sym-
metrically, we consider innovation by downstream producers and show that vertical integration
reduces R&D incentive of the integrated rm but increases that of the non-integrated rm. In our
model, the monopoly upstream supplier may strategically choose not to integrate with a down-
stream rm in order to deter R&D investment by the non-integrating downstream rm.
Allain, Chambolle, and Rey (2015) study the e¤ects of vertical integration on downstream rms
incentives to increase the quality of the nal products. In their model, downstream R&D requires
information exchanges with an upstream supplier, which may hinder downstream innovation if
sensitive information is leaked to downstream rivals. Vertical integration reduces the integrated
suppliers ability to interact with non-integrated competitors. In our paper, the reward for inno-
vation is the (endogenous) extra prot that an innovator can earn, and the driving forces for our
results are the structural changes brought about by downstream R&D.8
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and derives some
basic expressions. Sections 3 and 4 examine standalone incentives for R&D of the integrated and
non-integrated downstream rms, respectively. Section 5 discusses strategic vertical integration
and separation. Extension of R&D competition is considered in Sections 6. Section 7 concludes the
paper. Proofs are regulated in Appendix A and the analysis of upstream innovation is provided in
Appendix B.
2 Model
Consider a model of two vertically related industries: a downstream industry and an upstream
industry. In the downstream industry, two rms, D1 and D2, compete with horizontally di¤eren-
tiated products. The demand function for Dis product is pi(qi; qj) , which satises the following
properties:
@pi
@qj
< 0 for i; j = 1; 2
and @pi@qi
 > @pi@qj
 for j 6= i.
8Some recent papers investigate the incentive to innovate in a vertical market structure when a downstream rm
can integrate backward through innovation. Inderst, Jakubovic and Jovanovic (2015) examine the shift of innovation
activity away from manufacturers and towards large retailers and show that there is a hold-up e¤ect when upstream
rms innovate and a rent appropriation e¤ect when innovations come from the retailers. Chamboll, Christin and
Meunier (2015) study a situation where a retailer may either choose to integrate backward with a small rm or rely
on a national brand manufacturer to product its private label.
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The downstream competition can be in either Cournot or Bertrand fashion. Our main results are
derived based on the general demand system.9
The production of the nal products requires a single input that is supplied by an upstream
rm U0 with marginal cost of production c > 0. Initially, U0 is the only supplier of the input. One
unit of each nal product requires exactly one unit of the input. The costs of transforming the
input into a nal product are normalised to zero.
There are two alternative market structures: vertical separation (V S), in which all three rms
are independent entities, and vertical integration (V I), in which U0 andD1 are vertically integrated.
We refer to D1 as the integrating rm, and D2 as the non-integrating rm. Under V S, U0 sells the
input to both D1 and D2. Under V I, the integrating rm supplies the input to D1 internally at
cost and to the downstream rival D2 at some chosen price.
Both downstream rms have the capability to invent a new input that can be used in place of
the one currently produced by U0. We refer to the new input producer as Un and assume that the
new input has a higher quality than the old one. This quality premium can be transformed to a
cost premium,10 i.e., the new input is identical to the existing input but can be produced at a lower
e¤ective marginal cost c   d, where the cost di¤erential d 2 [0; c] measures the signicance of the
innovation. After an innovation, there may or may not be competition between Un and U0 in the
upstream industry depending on the initial market structure. The upstream competition, if any, is
assumed to be in price.
Let tji denote rm Dis equilibrium prot under market structure t when rm j is the innovator,
where t = S (V S) or V (V I) and i; j = 1; 2. Firm Dis pre-innovation prot (i.e., when neither
rm innovates) is denoted as S0i and V
0
i for V S and V I, respectively.
2.1 Downstream competition
In the downstream industry, suppose that rm Di obtains the input at price wi and its rival obtains
the input at price wj , and denote the equilibrium output and prot of Di as q(wi; wj) and (wi; wj),
respectively. We assume the usual properties (they all hold for both Cournot and Bertrand prots):
@(wi; wj)
@wi
< 0;
@(wi; wj)
@wj
> 0; and
d(w;w)
dw
< 0:
Note that wi and wj are endogenous, to be determined by market competition under either the V S
or V I market structure.
2.2 Pre-innovation equilibrium under vertical separation_
Under V S, the two downstream rms are symmetric, so U0 charges the same price, w, to D1 and
D2 for supplying the input: w1 = w2 = w. The derived demand for U0s input is thus 2q(w;w). U0
solves the following optimisation problem:
max
w
2(w   c)q(w;w): (1)
9For results on R&D competition in section 6, we will consider the following linear demand system:
pi = a  qi   qj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j,
where  2 (0; 1) represents the degree of product substitution.
10This assumption enables us to avoid the complication of modelling how di¤erentiated inputs are transformed into
di¤erentiated nal products.
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Let wS(c) denote the solution, and note that wS(c) > c. The two downstream rmsprots are
S01 = S
0
2 = (w
S(c); wS(c)).
2.3 Pre-innovation equilibrium under vertical integration_
Under V I, D1 and U0 are integrated, so U0 supplies the input to D1 at cost c. Suppose that U0
sells the input to D2 at price w2.11 The derived demand from D2 for the input is thus q(w2; c).
Receiving prots from both upstream and downstream businesses, the integrating rm solves the
following problem:
max
w2
(w2   c)q(w2; c) + (c; w2): (2)
Let wI(c) denote the solution, which represents the optimal input price that a vertically integrated
rm charges to its downstream rival when the input production cost is c. Depending on whether
the downstream competition is Cournot or Bertrand, the expression of wI(c) may di¤er (see the
Appendix), but wI(c) always increases in c, which is to be expected. Once wI(c) is derived, the
resulting equilibrium prot of the integrating rm is then
V 01 = [w
I(c)  c]q(wI(c); c) + (c; wI(c))  V (c),
and the prot of D2 is V 02 = (w
I(c); c).
Remark 1 (Raising rivals cost e¤ect of VI): wI(c) > c and V 02 <S
0
2 :
Remark 1 is a form of raising rivals cost e¤ect of vertical integraton well studied in the literature
(see, e.g., Ordover, Saloner, and Salop, 1990). Vertical integration between D1 and the upstream
incumbent rm raises the input price facing D2 relative to that of D1, thereby lowering the pre-
innovation prot of D2. This e¤ect is beyond the result of Proposition 2 as well that on strategic
separation (Proposition 3b) to be derived below.
3 R&D incentive by the integrating rm
To study how V I alters a downstream rms incentive to innovate, we rst investigate what Tirole
(1988) calls the pure incentive to innovate. That is, we assume that only one downstream rm
has the capacity to innovate: either D1 (this section) or D2 (next section). Section 6 considers the
case where both rms compete in R&D investments.
3.1 Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical integration_
Suppose that D1 is the only rm capable of R&D. If D1 and U0are initially integrated, D1s
invention does not change the market structure. D1 and the upstream supplier (now Un instead
of U0) remain integrated and continue to supply their downstream rival D2. D1s optimisation
problem now becomes
max
w2
[w2   (c  d)]q(w2; c  d) + (c  d;w2): (3)
11Foreclosure is allowed, as w2 is under D1s control and can therefore be set at such a high level that D2 buys
no input from D1. However, in our model with product di¤erentiation, it can be shown that downstream foreclosure
never occurs unless the nal products are homogeneous.
6
This problem is identical to (2) except that the input production cost is c   d instead of c.
Consequently, the solution must be w2 = wI(c   d), and the two downstream rmsprots are
V 11 = V (c  d) and V 12 = (wI(c  d); c  d), respectively, using the equilibrium expressions dened
earlier.
3.2 Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical separation_
Suppose that D1 and U0 are initially separated. After D1invents the new input, it no longer needs
to purchase the input from U0; it produces its own input in-house. Under V S, therefore, input
innovation enables the innovating downstream rm to become vertically integrated. In addition, D1
is now capable of entering backward into the upstream market and competing with the incumbent
supplier U0 in supplying the input to its downstream competitor, D2.12 Given the cost advantage
of the new input and Bertrand competition in the upstream market, D1 is able to grab the entire
input market by undercutting the incumbent supplier, U0.
Specically, D1 faces the following optimisation problem after its innovation: Choose the input
price charged to D2, w2, so as to maximize its total prot from both downstream and upstream
businesses, subject to the constraint that w2 cannot exceed its upstream rival U0s unit cost, c:
max
w2
[w2   (c  d)]q(w2; c  d) + (c  d;w2); s.t. w2  c: (4)
This optimisation problem is identical to (3) except for the constraint of w2  c. There are therefore
two possibilities. If the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem (3), w2 = wI(c  d), is
no greater that c, then U0 does not impose any competitive pressure on Un, and D1s optimal input
price in (4) equals wI(c  d). Such a case is referred to as drastic innovation.13 Recall that wI(c)
increases with c, which implies that wI(c d) decreases with d. Then an innovation is drastic if and
only if d is su¢ ciently large. If, however, wI(c  d) > c, then D1 is constrained by the competition
from U0 and has to charge w2 = c. This case is referred to as non-drastic innovation.
To summarise, if D1 innovates under V S, then the equilibrium input price charged to D2 is
w2 = minfwI(c  d); cg. The resulting prot of D1 equals
S11 = [w

2   (c  d)]q(w2; c  d) + (c  d;w2),
whereas D2s equilibrium prot is S12 = (w

2; c  d).
Note that under V S, the incumbent upstream supplier, U0, is always driven out of business
regardless of the signicance of the innovation. The innovating downstream rm not only obtains
its own input but also supplies the input to its downstream rival. Therefore, innovation brings
structural change under V S, but preserves market structure under V I as seen earlier. Also note
that when the innovation is drastic, w2 = wI(c   d) and therefore S11 = V 11 and S12 = V 12 , i.e.,
12While obtaining extra business from selling its input, Uns participation in the upstream competition reduces
the supply price that D2 pays for its input, thus hurting D1s downstream business. D1 may therefore wish (and
claim) to refrain from entering the input market so as to keep its rivals cost high. However, such a claim may not
be credible. Given the nature of Bertrand competition in the upstream industry, for any price that U0 charges D2,
Un can undercut and grab the whole business. Such commitment issue (by a vertically integrated rm to supply its
downstream competitor) also arises in Ordover et. al (1990), as pointed out by Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rei¤en
(1992).
13Arrow (1962) has used the term drastic to refer to an innovation for which existing products or processes do not
constrain the inventors prot-maximizing price. See also Gilbert (2006b).
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the post-innovation equilibria under V S and V I are the same. These results are highlighted in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1: Consider an innovation by the integrating rm.
(i) The innovation changes the market structure under V S but not under V I.
(ii) If the innovation is drastic, the post-innovation equilibrium is the same whether the original
market structure was V S or V I.
3.3 E¤ect of vertical integration on D1s R&D incentive
We are now ready to compare D1s R&D incentives between the two market structures, i.e., to
compare V1  V 11   V 01 under V I with S1  S11   S01 under V S. We consider drastic and non-
drastic innovations in turn. Note that V 11   V 01 = V (c  d)  V (c); that is, R&D by D1 under V I
does not lead to any structural change and the innovation simply entails the replacement of the old
input by the new input.
If the innovation is drastic, we have shown that the post-innovation equilibrium is exactly the
same regardless of whether the original market structure was V I or V S: V 11 = S
1
1 . Before the
innovation, it is obvious that D1 earns greater prot under V I than it does under V S: V 01 > S
0
1 . It
follows immediately that V 11  V 01 < S11 S01 . For drastic innovation, therefore, D1s R&D incentive
is greater under V S than under V I.
One way to understand the proceeding result is to decompose D1s R&D incentive under V S
into two parts. For drastic innovation,
S1  S11   S01 = V 11   S01 =
 
V 01   S01

+ (V 11   V 01 ).
The rst part of the last expression, V 01   S01 , can be called the integration e¤ect: input R&D
transforms D1 from a vertically separated rm to an integrated rm that can earn a prot of V 01
even if it uses the old technology. The second part, V 11  V 01 , captures an e¢ ciency e¤ect whereby an
already integrated D1 can further increase its prot by using the new technology. The integration
e¤ect highlights the structural change brought about by input R&D under V S; no such structural
change exists if the market structure was V I initially. The above decomposition shows clearly the
extra incentive for R&D under V S, as D1s R&D incentive under V I contains only the e¢ ciency
e¤ect (V1 = V
1
1   V 01 ).
If the innovation is non-drastic, the comparison between V1 and 
S
1 is no longer so straight-
forward. After the innovation, the market structure under V S is similar but not identical to that
under V I. In both cases, D1 is the only upstream supplier and its own input is acquired at cost
c  d. The only di¤erence is that the input price charged to D2 is constrained under V S (w2 = c)
but not under V I (w2 = wI(c d) > c). Therefore, D1s post-innovation prot is greater under V I
than under V S (V 11 > S
1
1). Before the innovation, D1s pre-innovation prot is also higher under
V I than under V S (V 01 > S
0
1), as pointed out earlier. To compare V
1
1   V 01 with S11   S01 , it helps
to rst look at the extreme case of d = 0. Under V S, both downstream rms obtain their inputs
at wS(c) before the innovation, and at c after the innovation (for D1, it it the new supplier Uns
cost c   d = c; for D2, it is the old supplier U0s cost c). As the input price is lower, both rms
benet. In particular, S11 > S
0
1 . Notice an interesting observation here: D1s innovation raises not
only its own prot, but also D2s prot. In a vertical setting, therefore, a rm may benet from its
competitors innovation, which never happens in horizontal settings.
When d = 0, therefore, S11 S01 > 0. Meanwhile, V 11  V 01 = V (c d) V (c) = 0. It follows that
V 11   V 01 < S11   S01 . That is, if the innovation does not reduce the production cost, it has no value
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under V I, as it does not change the market structure. However, such innovation is still valuable
under V S because it enables the innovator to become vertically integrated with its supplier and
thus obtain its input at a lower price even though the input production cost has not changed. For
this reason, D1s R&D incentive is stronger under V S than under V I when d = 0.
What about d > 0? As mentioned earlier, in the post-innovation equilibrium under V S, D1
obtains its own input at c   d and supplies the input to D2 at the constrained price, c. The cost
di¤erential d measures how severe the constraint is: a larger d means a more relaxed constraint. (In
fact, when d is su¢ ciently large so that the innovation becomes drastic, the constraint disappears
completely.) As D1 faces the constraint under V S but not under V I, a more relaxed constraint
favors D1s performance under V S over V I. In the previous paragraph we have established that
even under the most severe constraint of d = 0, D1s R&D incentive under V S is still greater than
that under V I. If d > 0 so that D1s performance under V S is further enhanced, the conclusion
must continue to hold.
To summarise, for both drastic and non-drastic innovations, we have the following result (the
proof can be found in the Appendix):
Proposition 1: Vertical integration reduces the integrating downstream rms innovation in-
centive: V1 < 
S
1 .
For drastic innovation, the result can be explained by the replacement e¤ect, as the post-
innovation outcome is independent of the pre-innovation market structure. For non-drastic inno-
vation, the driving force is that D1s innovation brings structural changes only under V S, and is
therefore more valuable there than under V I.14
4 R&D incentive by the non-integrating rm
We now turn to the e¤ect of V I on the non-integrating downstream rms R&D incentive. Suppose
that D2 is the only rm that can innovate. Before the innovation, D2 relies on U0 for the supply of
the input under both V I (where U0 and D1 are integrated) and V S, and its pre-innovation prots
under the two market structures have already been derived.
4.1 Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical separation_
Under V S, D1 and D2 are symmetric, so D2s post-innovation prot as the innovator is the same
as D1s when D1 is the innovator: S22 = S
1
1 . Specically, the input innovation by D2 transforms it
into an integrated rm that supplies the new input to its own downstream business at cost c   d,
and to its downstream competitor D1 at either the non-constrained price wI(c d) if the innovation
is drastic, or the constrained price c if the innovation is non-drastic. Note that the non-innovators
prot is also symmetric: S21 = S
1
2 .
14Our results are robust to other forms of contracting. For example, if the upstream supplier uses a two-part tari¤
to capture the entire downstream prot, the downstream rms innovation incentive is still higher under V S than V I.
To see this, note that the innovating rm earns the same post-innovation prot under both V S and V I. However,
there is a positive pre-innovation prot for the integrating rm under V I but none for the downstream rm under
V S. Similarly, if secret contracts would be o¤ered, the downstream rm would earn less pre-innovation prot under
V S and thus its innovation incentive would still be higher under V S than V
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4.2 Post-innovation equilibrium under vertical integration_
Under V I after D2 has innovated, there are two vertically integrated entities: one is between D1
and U0, which produces the input at c; the other is between D2 and Un, which produces the input
at c d. If Un supplies the input to D1 at price c ", where " is a very small positive value, U0
S
D1
certainly accepts the deal. The sale also increases D2s total prot because its downstream prot
is not hurt (w1 = c and w2 = c   d in either case), and it now has some extra upstream business
(as the supply price to D1, c, is greater than the marginal production cost of the new input, c  d).
As a result, it is a dominant strategy for Un to supply the input to D1 (at a price no greater than
c), and D1 accepts the o¤er.15
In supplying D1, Un chooses the input price w1 to maximise the sum of its prot from supplying
its downstream competitor D1 and its own downstream unit D2s business, subject to the constraint
that this price does not exceed U0s own cost, c:
max
w1
[w1   (c  d)]q(w1; c  d) + (c  d;w1) s.t. w1  c: (5)
This optimisation problem faced by D2 under V I is exactly the same as that faced by D1 under V S,
equation (4). As D1 and D2 are symmetric under V S, this implies that when D2 is the innovator,
the post-innovation equilibrium is exactly the same whether D1 and U0 were originally integrated
(the case of V I) or separated (the case of V S). After D2s innovation, the original upstream
supplier U0, which is an in-house supplier for D1 under V I and an independent supplier under
V S, always foreclosed due to its cost disadvantage, but the mechanism of the foreclosure is slightly
di¤erent between the two vertical structures. If U0 and D1 were integrated, their input production
cost and hence the internal supply price are xed at c, which is undercut by the new supplier Un.
If U0 and D1 were separated, Un and U0 engage in Bertrand competition in the upstream market,
which drives the price down to a level equal to or below U0s unit cost, c.
To summarise:
Lemma 2. Consider an innovation by the non-integrating rm.
(i) Innovation changes the market structure under both V S and V I.
(ii) Innovation leads to the same market structure and equilibrium outcome regardless of the
initial market structure (whether V S or V I) or the signicance of the innovation (whether drastic
or non-drastic).
4.3 E¤ect of vertical integration on D2s R&D incentive
Given that D2 is the only innovator, the net gain of a successful R&D to D2 is V2  V 22   V 02
under V I, and is S2  S22   S02 under V S. According to Lemma 2, V 22 = S22 , i.e., D2s post-
innovation prot is the same regardless whether the initial vertical structure was V S or V I. D2s
pre-innovation prot, however, is smaller if U0 and D1 were integrated V 02 < S
0
2 (Remark 1). As a
result, D2s R&D incentive is stronger under V I than under V S: V2 = V
2
2   V 02 > S22   S02 = S2 .
We therefore reach the following conclusion.
Proposition 2: Vertical integration between a monopoly input supplier and a downstream rm
raises the non-integrating downstream rms innovation incentive: V2 > 
S
2 .
15Notice the interesting reversal of customer-supplier relationship. Before the innovation, the upstream supplier
(U0) is vertically integrated with D1 and supplies D2. After the innovation, the upstream supplier (Un) is vertically
integrated with D2 and supplies D1.
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As established by Lemma 2, innovation by D2 changes the market structure under both V I
or V S. Such a structural change always gives D2 a competitive advantage in the post-innovation
market. Prior to the innovation, D2 was on an equal footing with D1 under V S, but faced com-
petitive disadvantage in relation to D1 under V I. Successful R&D enables D2 to get rid of the
disadvantage under V I, thereby conferring a greater value than under V S.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 deliver a consistent message. Proposition 1 says that an
advantaged rm (i.e., D1 under V I) is less eager to innovate than a non-advantaged rm (i.e., D1
under V S), whereas Proposition 2 says that a disadvantaged rm (D2 under V I) is more eager
to innovate than a non-disadvantaged rm (D2 under V S). Both can be understood in terms
of the replacement e¤ect identied by Arrow (1962). Since innovation by D1 replaces the input
business of the upstream incumbent, vertical integration between the two rms internalises such
negative externality, leading to the result in Proposition 1. Likewise, integration between D1 and
the upstream incumbent reduces the pre-innovation prot of D2, thereby increasing D2s incentive
for R&D (Proposition 2).
5 Strategic Integration/Separation
In this section, we extend our main model to consider strategic incentives of the upstream monopoly
supplier in using vertical organisations to inuence downstream innovation. In particular, we intend
to make two points. First, under V S where only one of the downstream rms has access to R&D,
potential innovation may be deterred by a strategic vertical integration, which is mutually benecial
to the upstream rm and the innovating downstream rm. Second, the upstream incumbent may
choose to restrain itself from acquiring a downstream non-innovating rm to reduce the innovation
incentive of the downstream rival that has access to R&D. These results have important policy
implications.
5.1 Strategic vertical integration
Consider rst the possibility of vertical integration as a tool of deterring innovation. The market
is initially vertically separate and D1 is the only rm with access to R&D. There is a xed cost F1
for D1 to come up with the innovation as considered in the previous sections.
The game sequence is as follows. At stage 1, U0 rst makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (with
transfer payment) to fully acquire D1; D1 then decides on whether accept or reject the o¤er. At
stage 2, D1 decides whether to innovate by incurring the xed cost. Innovation byD1, if undertaken,
leads to the new input with unit cost of product c d. At stage 3, the rms compete in the product
markets, each receiving their equilibrium prots as derived in the previous sections.
There are four possible market/technology structures: (i) D1 accepts V I and innovates; (ii) D1
accepts V I and does not innovate; (iii) D1 rejects V I and innovates; and (iv) D1 rejects V I and
does not innovate. We consider the set of R&D projects such that
V 11   V 01  F1 < S11   S01 (6)
Based on Proposition 1, such F1 exists. For such values of R&D costs, innovation is protable for
D1 if it has rejected U0s V I o¤er in stage 1 of the game by not protable if it has accepted the
o¤er. Given this, the joint prots of U0 and D1 are equal to V 01 if D1 accepts the o¤er in stage
1, in which case U0 and D1 integrate with each other and choose not to conduct R&D afterwards,
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leaving the industry as integrated with the old input technology d. The joint prots of U0 and D1
equal S11   F1 if D1 rejects U0s o¤er in stage 1, in which case the independent D1 innovates and
subsequently enters backward to the input market and drives the incumbent rm U0 out of the
market. Note that V 11  S11 , i.e., D1 earns greater prot if it is the sole upstream rm with the
new input than if it innovates as a separated rm and then enter the upstream market to compete
with incumbent U0.
This, together with the above assumptions, implies that V 01 > V
1
1   F1  S11   F1. Thus,
vertical integration is mutually protable for U0 and D1 and hence they are able to nd a mutually
benecial o¤er with properly chosen transfer payment for D1 to accept the V I o¤er in stage 1 of
the previous game. Hence, we have the following result.
Proposition 3(a). Under vertical separation, where only one of the downstream rms has
access to R&D, innovation may be deterred by a strategic vertical integration between the upstream
rm and the downstream rm, if the R&D cost is such that V 11   V 01  F1 < S11   S01 .
When it occurs, strategic vertical integration deters innovation by a downstream rm that
would enable the rm to enter backward into the upstream sector and compete with the incumbent
supplier with a better input. The benet of such integration to the incumbent monopoly supplier
U0 is that it prevents it from being driven out by the R&D product and entry of D1. The benet
to the acquired downstream rm that would otherwise conduct R&D is that it saves on R&D cost
and is able to obtain the input (albeit old) at marginal cost. The independent downstream rm
D2 is actually worse o¤. Absent of such integration between U0 and D, D1 would conduct R&D
and be able to enter the upstream market with the new input, which would result in a lower input
price that D2 has to pay.
With such strategic vertical integration, the industry becomes (U0 D1, D2) with the old input
and monopoly pricing on input by the vertically integrated U0  D1. Absent such integration, the
industry would also become integrated as D1 enters the upstream market with its new innovation,
either replacing the incumbent rm or competing with it depending on whether the innovation is
drastic. In sum, strategic vertical integration in our model deters downstream innovation and entry
to the upstream sector, thereby necessarily reducing welfare (gross of R&D cost). Therefore, in
contrast with the relatively lenient treatment of vertical mergers in the EU and the Unite States,
our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should consider blocking such vertical mergers.
5.2 Strategic vertical separation
We now consider an alternative scenario where the target rm for vertical integration does not have
access to R&D, but the non-target rm does. In particular, we assume that D2 is the rm with
access to R&D, with xed cost F2. As before, U0 and D1 are initially separate rms and U0 makes
a "take-it-or-leave-it" vertical integration o¤er to D1. After D1s decision on whether to accept U0
o¤er, D2 decides on whether to innovate. Here, we consider the set of R&D projects such that
S22   S02  F2 < V 22   V 02 (7)
From Proposition 2, which tells us that the R&D incentive of D2 is greater if U0 and D1 merge
than if they do not, such F2 exists.
If D1 accepts the V I o¤er by U0, then D2 chooses to innovate because V 22  F2 > V 02 . If, instead,
D1 rejects the V I o¤er, D2 does not nd innovation protable because S22   F2  S02 . Given D2s
choice, the joint prot of U0 and D1 under V S is higher than their prot under V I if
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S01 + U
0
0 > V
2
1 : (8)
Condition (8) is likely to hold when d is small. To illustrate, take an extreme case, d = 0. In this
case, the innovation by D2 is merely to take over the upstream production without any e¢ ciency
improvement and thus, V 21 < S
0
1 .
16 Hence, (8) holds when d is su¢ ciently small. Note that under
(7) and (8), the rms contemplating vertical mergers choose not to merge, so as to deter D2s
innovation that would disrupt the industry by driving U0 out of the market and making D2 a more
competitive downstream rm in competing with D1. We summarise the discussions in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3(b). For an R&D cost such that S22   S02  F2 < V 22   V 02 and a certain range
of d > 0, the upstream incumbent rm chooses to restrain itself from acquiring a downstream rm
and the other downstream rm chooses to not conduct R&D in the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game.
It is worth noting again that absent of R&D, the incentive for integration is particularly strong
in our model as it eliminates double-marginalization between the merged rms (U0 and D1), and
the resulting raising rivals cost e¤ect as mentioned in Remark 1, which give them a cost-advantage
in downstream competition over rival rm D2. The downside of such vertical integration, as shown
above, is that it forces the downstream rival rm D2 into a corner which increases its incentive for
input R&D that disrupts the industry by driving the input division of the integrated rm out of
business. The above proposition shows that such a negative impact to the upstream rm and the
downstream target rm can be so huge that they rather choose to stay separate so as to not trigger
such a disruptive innovation by the downstream competitor. R&D as a counterattack measure on
the part of D2 severs as a credible threat that can deter vertical integration by the incumbent
supplier and its target rm.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the above result is similar to a nding in Loertscher and
Riordan (2014) who consider a procurement model with competing upstream rms that invest in
process R&D and a monopolist downstream that rm can source internally by vertical integration.
Loertscher and Riordan show that, among other things, it may pay the monopoly customer to
remain vertically separate so as to encourage innovation by upstream suppliers. They obtained this
result because vertical integration, which will result in an internal supplier which the downstream
customer can procure from, discourages R&D incentive by independent suppliers who anticipate
their disadvantageous post-R&D procurement position vis-a-vis the internal supplier. Similarly, our
model also identies a strategic incentive for rms to maintain vertical separation, in an attempt
to inuence subsequent R&D activity by other rms.
Another way of looking at the issue is through the value of commitment created by vertical
separation. As Loertscher and Riordan (2014) point out, in their model, "vertical divestiture is a
commitment to a level playing eld that encourages independent suppliers to invest in cost reduc-
tion." In our model, vertical separation is a commitment by the upstream monopoly supplier to not
discriminate against the independent downstream rm (D2) in its input price decision (by engag-
ing in price squeeze). This commitment confers a level playing eld in downstream competition,
thereby reducing (eliminating in the model above) the incentive of the otherwise disadvantegeous
independent rm to conduct input R&D.17
16Formally, if d = 0, then V 21 = V
1
2 = V
0
2 < S
0
2 = S
0
1 :
17 In a model without R&D, Lin (2006) shows that strategic separation enables the once-integrated rm to credibly
increase its supply to downstream rivals, thereby reducing the market shares of upstream rivals.
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Our result provides a new explanation for vertical disintegration as a way to deter innovation
from downstream rivals. Such a strategic separation, similar to strategic vertical integration, may
have a negative e¤ect on welfare because it may hinder innovation that would otherwise occur
in the absence of such spin-o¤ and may also lead to double-marginalisations on consumers of the
products of both downstream rms, because without the spin-o¤, the innovating downstream rm
would choose to innovate and hence become the integrated rm, eliminating the double markups
faced by its consumers.
6 R&D competition
So far we have discussed how vertical integration a¤ects the two downstream rmsR&D incentives,
assuming that only one of them can conduct R&D. In this section we extend our analysis to the case
of R&D competition, where both downstream rms can conduct R&D that may lead to invention
of a new input. Specically, in the rst stage of the game, for a given market structure (either
V S or V I), D1 and D2 simultaneously and independently choose their investments in R&D. As
in Allain, Chambolle and Rey (2015), the cost of R&D is assumed to be C(i) for rm Di, where
i 2 [0; 1] is Dis probability of R&D success and is referred to as its R&D investment, with C 0 > 0
and C 00 > 0. The outcomes of R&D projects are independent between the two rms. If only one
rm succeeds in innovation, the rm is granted the patent for the new input. If both succeed,
then each obtains the patent with a probability of one half.18 In the second stage of the game,
production and competition take place.
Recall the notation we have used so far: tji denotes rm Dis payo¤ under market structure
t when rm j is the innovator, where t = S (vertical separation) or V (vertical integration) and
i; j = 1; 2. Dis pre-innovation payo¤ is denoted as t0i . If both rms succeed in R&D, Dis expected
payo¤ is denoted as tbi . By assumption, t
b
i =
1
2(t
i
i + t
j
i ) for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. As rms D1 and
D2 are symmetric under V S, we have S21 = S
1
2 , S
1
1 = S
2
2 , S
0
1 = S
0
2 , and S
b
1 = S
b
2.
6.1 Vertical separation
Under V S and given the R&D investments of the two rms, 1 and 2, the payo¤ matrix (gross of
R&D costs) for D1 and D2 is
D1
. . .D2 Successful Not Successful
Successful Sb1; S
b
2 S
1
1 ; S
1
2
Not Successful S21 ; S
2
2 S
0
1 ; S
0
2
Given j , Di chooses i to maximise its expected prot under V S:
max
i
Si  i[jSbi + (1  j)Sii ] + (1  i)[jSji + (1  j)S0i ]  C(i).
The rst-order condition is
(1  j)(Sii   S0i ) + j(Sbi   Sji ) = C 0(i): (9)
18We are grateful to Patrick Rey for his useful comments and suggestions.
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The rst term on the left-hand side, Sii   S0i  Si , measures the value of Dis successful R&D
given that Dj does not succeed, and is referred to hereafter as Dis standalone incentive of R&D.
Apparently, a rms standalone incentive is the same as its R&D incentive when it is the only
rm capable of R&D, which we analysed earlier in Sections 3 and 4. The second term, Sbi   Sji ,
measures the value of Dis successful R&D given that Dj succeeds in R&D. It is therefore referred
to as Dis competitive incentive of R&D. More specically, Sbi  Sji = 12(Sii +Sji ) Sji = 12(Sii  Sji ).
Given Djs success, if Di also succeeds, it has a 50% chance of winning the patent, in which case
its payo¤ increases by Sii   Sji . With the remaining 50% of the chance, Dis successful R&D fails
to win the patent, so there is no change in its payo¤. Thus, the competitive incentive for a rm
equals half of the di¤erence between its payo¤ as the winner and its payo¤ as the loser. The above
rst-order condition says that rm Dis R&D investment is optimal if the marginal cost of its
R&D investment equals the marginal benet, which is a weighted average of its standalone and
competitive incentives.
The two rmsequilibrium R&D investments depend also on the strategic interaction between
their R&D choices. Note that
@2Si
@i@j
= S0i   Sbi .
Thus, the two rmsR&D investments are strategic substitutes (under V S) if and only if S0i < S
b
i ,
i.e., each rm earns greater prot if both rms succeed in R&D than if none succeeds. As the two
rms are symmetric under V S, this condition is equivalent to S0i +S
0
j < S
i
i +S
i
j , i.e., the innovation
under V S raises the two downstream rmsjoint prots, which apparently holds. Therefore, under
V S the two rmsR&D investments are strategic substitutes, meaning that a rm reduces its
investment in response to its rivals greater investment.
Let (S1 ; 
S
2 ) denote the Nash equilibrium of R&D competition under vertical separation. We
assume that the equilibrium is unique and stable. As D1 and D2 are symmetric under V S, we have
S1 = 
S
2 = 
S .
6.2 Vertical integration
Now suppose that U0 and D1 were integrated initially. The payo¤ matrix of the R&D game (gross
of R&D cost) under V I is similar to that under V S:
D1
. . .D2 Successful Not Successful
Successful V b1 ; V
b
2 V
1
1 ; V
1
2
Not Successful V 21 ; V
2
2 V
0
1 ; V
0
2
Given j , Di chooses i to maximise its expected prot under V I:
max
i
Vi  i[jV bi + (1  j)V ii ] + (1  i)[jV ji + (1  j)V 0i ]  C(i).
The rst-order condition is
(1  j)(V ii   V 0i ) + j(V bi   V ji ) = C 0(i).
As before, V ii   V 0i  Vi is Dis standalone incentive under V I, whereas V bi   V ji = 12(V ii   V ji ) is
Dis competitive incentive under V I.
15
Note that D1 and D2 are no longer symmetric under V I. For D1,
@2V1
@1@2
= V 01   V b1 .
Recall that V b1 =
1
2(V
1
1 + V
2
1 ), V
0
1 = V (c) and V
1
1 = V (c   d). If d = 0, we have V 01 = V 11
and therefore @
2V1
@1@2
= 12(V
1
1   V 21 ) > 0. Intuitively, if d is small, winning the patent is not very
rewarding for D1, while losing it to D2 is still damaging. Then, D1s payo¤ is higher when no rm
succeeds than when both succeed. In that case, D1s R&D investment is a strategic complement of
D2s investment, meaning that D1 increases its investment in response to D2s greater investment.
Of course, this is true only when the innovation is not signicant (i.e., d is small). If the innovation
is signicant (i.e., d is su¢ ciently large), the sign of @
2V1
@1@2
is reversed, and D1s R&D investment
becomes a strategic substitute of D2s investment under V I, as in the case of V S.
For D2,
@2V2
@1@2
= V 02   V b2 .
Thus, D2s R&D investment is a strategic substitute of D1s investment (i.e., @
22
@1@2
< 0) if and
only if D2s payo¤ is greater when both rms succeed in R&D than when neither succeeds, which is
likely to be true in general (it holds for both Cournot and Bertrand prots under linear demand).
Assume there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D competition under V I and denote the
equilibrium by (I1; 
I
2). We have the following result:
Proposition 4. When the two rms compete in R&D, vertical integration lowers the R&D
investment of the integrating rm and raises that of the non-integrating rm ( V1 < 
S
1 = 
S
2 < 
V
2 )
if the innovation is drastic. For non-drastic innovation, the same is true if the demand system is
linear and the R&D cost is quadratic.
The proposition says that R&D competition leads to the same conclusion as in the case of stand-
alone R&D: vertical integration reduces D1s R&D investment and raises D2s. The intuition for
drastic innovation is relatively easy to understand. R&D competition di¤ers from standalone R&D
in two aspects: each rm has an extra competitive incentive, and the two rmsR&D investments
are interdependent. If the innovation is drastic, the extra competitive incentive is the same for
both rms in both V S and V I (Lemma 3). Driven by the di¤erence in stand-alone incentives,
then, vertical integration tends to reduce D1s investment and raise D2s. Furthermore, the two
rmsR&D investments being strategic substitutes, D1s reduced investment further raises D2s
investment and vice versa. (For non-drastic innovation, the derivations are tedious. Nevertheless,
we are able to show that the conclusion still holds when the demand for the nal product is linear
and the R&D cost is quadratic.)
In Section 5, we have shown that the upstream incumbent chooses to restrain itself from acquir-
ing a downstream non-innovating rm in order to reduce the innovation incentive of the downstream
rival rm. Under R&D competition, we obtain a similar result by numerical analysis.
Remark 2. When the two downstream rms compete in R&D, there exist parameter values
under which the joint prot of U0 and D1 is greater under V S than under V I.
One immediate implication of the result is that U0 and D1 may choose to restrain themselves
from vertical integration for fear of raising D2s R&D incentive. In fact, with R&D competition,
vertical integration between U0 and D1leads to two opposing e¤ects on the integrating rms prot.
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On the one hand, the merge of U0 and D1 eliminates double-marginalisation which would give
them a cost-advantage in downstream competition with rival rm D2. This increases their joint
prot. On the other hand, integration raises D2s R&D incentive, which negatively a¤ects the
merged rms prot because the probability of D2 becoming the supplier in the upstream is higher
(Proposition 4). We are able to show that, under some parameter values, the latter e¤ect dominates
and consequently, U0 and D1 strategically choose not to merge even if they have such an option.
Put di¤erently, while having the option to raise rivals cost in the current product market through
vertical integration, the upstream rm chooses not to do so in anticipation of the counter measure
(R&D) by its downstream rival.
6.3 Industry rate of innovation
We have established that vertical integration reduces D1s equilibrium investment and raises D2s
investment. What about the aggregate industrial R&D activity? To answer this question, we use
the probability of at least one rm succeeding in R&D as a measure of the aggregate rate of R&D,
or social rate of innovation, calculated as t  1  (1  t1)(1  t2) under market structure t = V; S.
To simplify the calculation, we assume that the R&D cost function is quadratic: C(i)  2 (i)2,
where  > 0 measures the cost or complexity of R&D projects. We have the following result:
Proposition 5: Assume that innovation is drastic and the demand system for nal products
is linear. Then, for the above R&D cost fuction, there exists  > 0 such that vertical integration
lowers the industry rate of innovation ( V < S) if and only if  >  (i.e., R&D is su¢ ciently
costly).
The proposition states that vertical integration increases social innovation when the R&D
project is not very costly, but reduces social innovation when R&D is costly. The intuition can be
understood as follows. We have established that vertical integration reduces the R&D investment
of the integrated downstream rm and raises that of the non-integrated downstream rm (Propo-
sition 3). When R&D is not very costly (i.e.,  is small), D2s investment in R&D under vertical
integration can be so large that its success rate is close to 1, so R&D is almost certain to succeed
under V I, which is not the case under V S. When R&D is costly (i.e.,  is large), the intuition
can be best understood by considering drastic innovation, although the conclusion still holds for
non-drastic innovation. Roughly, the two rmstotal investment is determined by the extra joint
prot the innovation can bring. Since the innovation is drastic, the post-innovation outcome is
the same regardless of the pre-innovation market structure or who wins the patent, so the total
investment must be inversely related to the two rmspre-innovation joint prot. Because vertical
integration raises the two rmsjoint prot before the innovation, their total R&D investment is
smaller under V I than under V S. Again, part of the benet of innovation is vertical integration;
if rms are already integrated vertically before the innovation, the joint reward of innovation is
reduced, leading to a lower rate of innovation on the aggregate.
The result that vertical integration may enhance the social rate of innovation is particularly
interesting. When investigating how market structure a¤ects innovation (mostly in a horizontal
setting), existing researches usually consider the R&D incentive of a single rm.19 In this paper, we
consider not only the integrating rm, but also the non-integrating rm. Since the formers incentive
19There are some papers looking at how the aggregate innovation changes with the number of symmetric rms (e.g.,
Lee and Wilde 1980; Delbono and Denicolo 1991). Here, we compare the aggregate innovation between a symmetric
structure (i.e., V S) and an asymmetric structure (i.e., V I) with a xed number of rms.
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is weakened while the latters is enhanced, we further consider the joint e¤ect, and nd that market
concentration can be conducive to innovation. Market concentration puts a non-integrated rm at
a disadvantage, and thereby gives it greater incentive to conduct R&D.
7 Conclusions
Cross-market R&D, which enables the innovator to enter related markets, has not received much
attention in the literature. We study downstream rmsincentive to invent a new input in a two-
tier vertical industry. Successful input innovation brings about structural changes to the vertically
related industry as the innovative downstream rm enters backward into the upstream market and
competes with, or even drives out, the existing input supplier. We show that integration of the
incumbent input supplier with a downstream producer reduces the R&D incentive of the integrated
downstream rm and raises the incentive of the non-integrated downstream rm. The results hold
for general demands and R&D cost functions, whether one or both downstream rms conduct R&D,
regardless of the degree of product di¤erentiation or the mode of competition at either level of the
industry,20 and for both drastic and non-drastic innovations.
Our model identies the structural changes that can be brought about by input innovation. In
a vertically separated industry, downstream input R&D transforms the industry into an vertically
integrated one as the innovating downstream rm enters backward into the upstream industry. In a
vertically integrated industry, input R&D by the non-integrated rm leads to relationship reversal,
whereby the innovating non-integrated rm supplies the new input to its former supplier after R&D.
When such structural changes take place, a rms innovation brings the benets of both vertical
integration and cost reduction. By contrast, R&D by an already integrated rm generates only the
benet of cost reduction, and is thereby not as attractive to the rm.
The fear of structural changes caused by disruptive downstream R&D can produce strategic
incentives for vertical integration as well as for vertical separation. We show that situations exist
where an upstream supplier may takeover a downstream rm so as to preempt its otherwise dis-
ruptive R&D that would overthrow the supplier. Likewise, there are cases where the incumbent
supplier foregoes vertical integration with its downstream target rm and instead commits and
to remaining separated for fear of increasing the R&D incentive of the downstream competitor,
despite such integration would eliminate the double-marginalisation between the integrating rms
and raise the cost of the rival. These incentives for strategic integration/separation have not been
identied in the literature, to the best of our knowledge.
One can relate our ndings to the long-time debate between the Schumpeterian view of R&D,
which states that larger rms are more innovative, and the Arrownian argument, which stipulates
that smaller rms have stronger incentives for R&D because of their lower pre-innovation prots.
Economists have come to understand that both arguments have their merits and neither dominates
the other in theory. Unlike the case of horizontal mergers, our model predicts that vertical mergers
unambiguously reduce the R&D incentive of the merging rm but raise that of the non-merging rm.
20 In our model, competition in the downstream market can be either Bertrand or Cournot, but competition in
the upstream market is in price. This assumption simplies the analysis because in the post-innovation equilibrium
there is always only one supplier in the upstream market. If, instead, upstream competition is in Cournot fashion,
more scenarios may arise. In particular, for non-drastic innovation, the innovating downstream rm may enter the
upstream input market and compete with the incumbent supplier when the extent of innovation (the value of d) is
moderate, or choose to not enter the upstream market at all when d is su¢ ciently small. It can be shown that our
main results still hold, although the analyses are much more tedious.
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In addition to being readily testable, these results push us to think deeper about the similarities
and di¤erences between vertical and horizontal settings when investigating innovation incentives.
Our ndings can help antitrust authorities in deciding whether to challenge a vertical merger.
The model predicts that vertical integration reduces or even preempts innovation. When both
rms can conduct R&D, vertical integration may raise or reduce industry innovation depending
on how costly the R&D is. Thus, such possible dynamic e¤ects of vertical mergers should not
be ignored in antitrust enforcement. Also, the elimination of double marginalisation has been
recognized as having a major welfare-enhancing e¤ect and hence used as a major defense of vertical
integration. However, in innovative industries such a positive e¤ect can also be achieved through
innovation rather than by vertical integration, as is the case in our model. Therefore, in assessing
the competition e¤ects of vertical mergers, no integration may not be the proper counterfactual;
one may need to consider the likelihood of vertical integration forced by disruptive innovation.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
If the innovation is drastic, then S11 = V
1
1 . However,
V 01  maxw (c; w) + (w   c)q(w; c)
 (c; wS) + (wS   c)q(wS ; c)
 (c; wS)
> (wS ; wS)  S01 .
As a result, V 11   V 01 < S11   S01 .
For non-drastic innovation, rst consider the case of d = 0. Then, V1 = V (c   d)   V (c) =
V (c)   V (c) = 0. Before the innovation, D1 earns S01 = (wS(c); wS(c)). After the innovation,
D1 obtains its own input at cost c. Meanwhile, upstream competition between Un and U0 (both
producing the input at cost c) means D2 obtains its input also at cost c. Therefore, D1s post-
innovation prot is S11 = (c; c). Because w
S(c) > c and given our assumption that d(w;w)dw < 0,
we conclude that S11 = (c; c) > (w
S(c); wS(c)) = S01 . In sum, when d = 0, 
V
1 = V
1
1   V 01 = 0
while S1 = S
1
1   S01 > 0, so V 11   V 01 < S11   S01 , or equivalently V 11   V 01 < S11   S01 .
We next show that V 11   S11 (which is positive) decreases in d. Note that V 11 is the value
of the unconstrained optimisation problem (3), while S11 is the value of the same optimisation
problem with a constraint that the choice variable w2 cannot exceed c (equation (4)). Let f(w; d)
denote D1s objective function, where w is its choice variable (this is w2 in the text) and d is
the parameter. Then, V 11 = maxw f(w; d) and S
1
1 = maxw , s.t. wc f(w; d). Let w(d) denote the
solution to the unconstrained optimisation problem. Then, it must satisfy the rst-order condition
(FOC): fw(w(d); d)  0, where fw means @f@w . Take the total di¤erentiation of the FOC on d:
@fw
@w w0(d) + @fw@d = 0. However, @fw@w = @
2f
@w2
< 0 by the second-order condition, while we know that
w0(d) < 0. Then, it must be the case that @fw@d < 0. Note that
@fw
@d =
@2f(w;d)
@w@d =
@fd(w;d)
@w , where
fd means
@f
@d . Now, V
1
1 is the objective function evaluated at the optimal choice w = w(d);soV
1
1 =
f(w(d); d), while S11 is the same objective function evaluated at c because the constraint w  c is
binding for non-drastic innovation: S11 = f(c; d). Then,
@
@d(V
1
1   S11) = @f(w(d);d)@d   @f(c;d)@d . By the
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envelope theorem, @f(w(d);d)@d =
@f( w;d)
@d = fdjw= w, while @f(c;d)@d = fdjw=c. Since w = w(d) > c and
@fd(w;d)
@w < 0, it must be that fdjw= w < fdjw=c, i.e., @@d(V 11   S11) < 0.
Finally, note that V 11   V 01 < S11   S01 if and only if V 11   S11 < V 01   S01 . The right-hand side is
independent of d, while we conclud that (1) the left-hand side decreases in d; and (2) the inequality
V 11   S11 < V 01   S01 holds for d = 0. Then, the inequality must hold for any d > 0 (such that the
innovation is non-drastic).
Payo¤s when downstream competition is Cournot.
Suppose that the downstream competition is Cournot and the demand for rmDis nal product
is:
pi = a  qi   qj ,
where  2 [0; 1] represents the degree of product substitution. Given the input prices wi and wj ,
it can be shown that rm Dis Cournot output is q(wi; wj) =
(2 )a 2wi+wj
4 2 , and its downstream
Cournot prot is
(wi; wj) =

(2  )a  2wi + wj
4  2
2
.
The equilibrium input price under V I (solution to (2)) is then solved as wI(c) = a  a c2 8 2
2 3
8 32 ,
and that under V S (solution to (1)) is wS(c) = a+c2 . The innovation is drastic (i.e., w
I(c  d)  c)
if and only if   da c  8 4
2+3
8 22 3  J , where  is the normalised signicance of the innovation.
Let A = (a  c)2. We have the following prot expressions:
V 01 = A
(12  8 + 2)
4(8  32) ; V
0
2 = A
4(1  )2
(8  32)2 .
S01 = S
0
2 =
A
4(2 + )2
.
V 11 = V
0
1 (1 + )
2; V 12 = V
0
2 (1 + )
2.
For non-drastic innovation,
S11 = A

[(2  )  ]
4  2 +
[(2  ) + 2]2
(4  2)2

, S12 = A
[(2  )  ]2
(4  2)2 .
Payo¤s when downstream competition is Bertrand.
Now consider downstream Bertrand competition. The demand is given by21
qi = h(1  b)  pi + bpj ,
21A general linear demand for Bertrand competition can be represented by qi = h0   kpi + bpj . Because h0, k and
b are homogeneous of degree one, we can normalize k = 1 without any loss of generality. It turns out that we may
have another normalization:  = d
h0
1 b c
, which can be achieved by assuming h0 = (1   b)h in the demand function.
Then all prots depend only on b and  ((h  c)2 is a common factor for all prots), just like in the case of Cournot
competition. Note that h0 = (1   b)h is just a transformation of variable. It does not place any constraint on the
demand system, which still contains two independent parameters. Since our major results are not about comparative
statics concerning b, it does not matter whether the vertical intercept is h0 or h(1  b).
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where b 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of product substitution. Given the input prices wi and wj , it
can be shown that rm Dis equilibrium price for its nal product is p(wi; wj) =
(2 b b2)h+2wi+bwj
4 b2 ,
and its equilibrium downstream prot is
(wi; wj) =

(2  b  b2)h  (2  b2)wi + bwj
4  b2
2
.
The equilibrium input price is wI(c) = h   h c2 8 6b
2+b3+b4
8 7b2+b4 under V I, and is w
S(c) = h+c2 under
V S. The innovation is drastic (i.e., wI(c  d)  c) if and only if   dh c  8 8b
2 b3+b4
8 6b2+b3+b4  J .
Let   dh c and A = (h  c)2. Then, the equilibrium prots under di¤erent market structures
are:22
V 01 =
A(1  b)2
4
12 + 16b+ 5b2
8  7b2 + b4 ; V
0
2 =
A(1  b)2
4

4  4b2   b3
8  7b2 + b4
2
.
S01 = S
0
2 =
A(1  b)2
4
1
(2  b)2 .
V 11 = V
0
1 (1 + )
2; V 12 = V
0
2 (1 + )
2.
For non-drastic innovation, we have
S11 = A

[(2  b  b2)  b]
4  b2 +
[(2  b  b2) + (2  b2)]2
(4  b2)2

, S12 = A
[(2  b  b2)  b]2
(4  b2)2 .
Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof proceeds as follows. We rst characterise the equilibrium investments in R&D under
V S and V I. Then, we provide a result (Lemma 3) on the competitive incentives. Finally, we show
that vertical integration lowers the R&D investment of the integrating rm and raises that of the
non-integrating rm.
Step 1. We rst compare equilibrium investments in R&D under the two market structures V S
and V I. The equilibrium under V S is solved from:
(1  2)(S11   S01) + 2(Sb1   S21) = C 0(1)
(1  1)(S22   S02) + 1(Sb2   S12) = C 0(2)
Similarly, the equilibrium under V I is solved from:
(1  2)(V 11   V 01 ) + 2(V b1   V 21 ) = C 0(1)
(1  1)(V 22   V 02 ) + 1(V b2   V 12 ) = C 0(2)
Since the marginal cost of R&D is the same across the two market structures, any di¤erence
in equilibrium R&D investment must be driven by the di¤erence in the marginal benet of R&D,
which, as mentioned earlier, is a weighted average of a rms standalone and competitive incentives.
22We assume b < 0:9 so that the nal products are not too closely substitutable, so as to guarantee that the
non-integrating rm is still active in the downstream market. No such condition about foreclosure is needed under
downstream Cournot competition.
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Propositions 1 and 2 have established that vertical integration reduces D1s stand-alone incentive
(V 11   V 01 < S11   S01) and raises D2s standalone incentive (V 22   V 02 > S22   S02).
Step 2. Regarding the competitive incentives, we have the following result.
Lemma 3:
(i) If the innovation is drastic, a rms competitive incentive of R&D is independent of the
market structure or the rms identity (i.e., V b1   V 21 = Sb1   S21 = V b2   V 12 = Sb2   S12).
(ii) If the innovation is non-drastic, both rmscompetitive incentives of R&D are greater under
V I than under V S (i.e., V b1   V 21 > Sb1   S21 , and V b2   V 12 > Sb2   S12).
The proof is given as follows. By Lemmas 1 and 2, when the innovation is drastic, the post-
innovation equilibrium under V I is the same as that under V S regardless of who the innovator is:
V ii = S
i
i and V
j
i = S
j
i for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i. As a result, V bi = 12(V ii + V ji ) = 12(Sii + Sji ) = Sbi and
consequently V bi  V ji = Sbi  Sji . That is, if the innovation is drastic, a rms competitive incentive
is the same whether the market structure is V I or V S.
For non-drastic innovation, D1s competitive incentive under V I is V b1  V 21 = 12(V 11 +V 21 ) V 21 =
1
2(V
1
1   V 21 ), and that under V S is similarly Sb1   S21 = 12(S11   S21). Because V 11 > S11 (D1 achieves
unconstrained maximum for V 11 , but is constrained by the independent U0 for S
1
1), and V
2
1 = S
2
1
by Lemma 2 (when D2 is the innovator, the post-innovation equilibrium is the same whether its
V I or V S), we conclude that V b1   V 21 > Sb1   S21 , i.e., vertical integration raises D1s competitive
incentive.
D2s competitive incentive under V I is V b2  V 12 = 12(V 22  V 12 ), and that under V S is Sb2 S12 =
1
2(S
2
2   S12). Because V 22 = S22 by Lemma 2, while V 12 > S12 (between S12 and V 12 , w1 = c  d is the
same, but w2 = c for S12 , while w2 = w
I(c  d) > c for V 12 ), we conclude that V b2   V 12 > Sb2   S12 ,
i.e., vertical integration raises D2s competitive incentive.
To understand the intuition of Lemma 3, recall that a rms competitive incentive is related
to the di¤erence between its payo¤ as the winner and that as the los in R&D competition. If
the innovation is drastic, the equilibrium is the same between V I and V S whether the innovator
is D1 (Lemma 1) or D2 (Lemma 2). In particular, the vertical structure does not a¤ect a given
rms payo¤ either as the winner or loser, and hence does not a¤ect the di¤erence between the two
payo¤s. This means that for drastic innovation, a rms competitive incentive is the same whether
the vertical structure is V I or V S. Now consider non-drastic innovation. For D1, its payo¤ as the
loser is independent of the vertical structure (Lemma 2, as D2 is the winner) ), but its payo¤ as the
winner is larger under V I than under V S, where it has to compete with the incumbent supplier U0
in supplying D2. As a result, D1s competitive incentive is greater under V I. For D2, its payo¤ as
the winner is independent of the vertical structure (Lemma 2), but its payo¤ as the loser is smaller
under V I than under V S, so its competitive incentive is also greater under V I.
Step 3.
For drastic innovation, Lemma 3 together with Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that vertical
integration lowers the marginal benet of R&D for D1 and raises that for D2. Refer to Figure 1
for the two rmsbest response curves for drastic innovation, where the solid lines are those under
V S and the dashed lines are those under V I. Consider rm D1s best responses under the two
market structures. If 2 = 1, D1s marginal benet of R&D equals its competitive incentive, which
is the same whether it is V S or V I, so D1s two best response curves intersect at this point. When
2 < 1, D1s marginal benet is a weighted average of its stanalone and competitive incentives. Its
competitive incentive is the same, but its standalone incentive is smaller under V I than under V S,
so D1s best response under V I is everywhere below its best response under V S. Moving from V S
22
to V I, therefore, D1s best response rotates downward around the upper intercept (where 2 = 1).
By a similar argument, moving from V S to V I, D2s best response rotates upward around the right
intercept (where 1 = 1). Now consider the equilibrium R&D investment under the two vertical
structures. Under V S, the two rmsbest response curves are symmetric and downward sloping.
Moving from V S to V I, then, the two rmsbest responses intersect at a point to the northwest
of the V S intersection, which means that D1s R&D investment is smaller, whereas D2s R&D
investment is larger.
Figure 1: Best response curves for drastic innovation
For non-drastic innovation, refer to Figure 2 for the two rmsbest response curves. The two
symmetric best response curves under V S (the solid lines) are similar to those in Figure 1. For
D2, vertical integration raises its standalone incentive (Proposition 2) and competitive incentive
(Lemma 3), so moving from V S to V I, D2s best response shifts up for any value of 1. For
D1, vertical integration lowers its standalone incentive (Proposition 1) and raises its competitive
incentive (Lemma 3), so D1s best response curve under V I may be upward or downward sloping,
but what matters for the comparison between (S1 ; 
S
2 ) and (
V
1 ; 
V
2 ) is where 
V
1 (
V
2 ) intersects
S1 (
S
2 ), not the slope of D1s best response curve.
Figure 2: Best response curves for non-drastic innovation
Given that the R&D cost function is C() = 2
2, the two rmsbest response functions under
V S (which are symmetric) are determined by
(1  2)(S11   S01) + 2(Sb1   S21) = 1 (10)
(1  1)(S22   S02) + 1(Sb2   S12) = 2 (11)
and their best response functions under V I are determined by
(1  2)(V 11   V 01 ) + 2(V b1   V 21 ) = 1 (12)
(1  1)(V 22   V 02 ) + 1(V b2   V 12 ) = 2 (13)
The left-hand side of (10) can be rewritten as (S11   S01)   2(Sb1   S01), and the left-hand side of
(12) is (V 11   V 01 )  2(V b1   V 01 ). Then the intersection of these two functions is characterised by
(S11  S01)  2(Sb1 S01) = (V 11  V 01 )  2(V b1  V 01 ), or 2 = (S
1
1 S01) (V 11  V 01 )
(Sb1 S01) (V b1  V 01 )
. The V S equilibrium
(i.e., the intersection between (10) and (11)) leads to s2 =
S11 S01
+Sb1 S01
. Then, 2 > s2 if and only if
 >
(Sb1 S01)(V b1  V 01 ) (S11 S01)(V b1  V 01 )
(S11 S01) (V 11  V 01 )
 1. However, for (12) and (13) to intersect within the range
of 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 2 (0; 1), we must have  > V 22   V 02 . It can be shown from both the Cournot
prots and the Bertrand prots that V 22   V 02 > 1. Therefore, 2 > s2. When the demand is
linear (either Cournot or Bertrand in downstream competition) and R&D cost is quadratic, the
intersection between V1 (
V
2 ) and 
S
1 (
S
2 ) leads to a 2 that is above the V S equilibrium 
S
2 . It is
then clear from Figure 2 that the V I equilibrium has a smaller 1 and a greater 2 than the V S
equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
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Note that C 0(i) = i and hence the rst-order conditions (FOCs) can be rewritten as
ti +M
t
i 
t
j = A
t
i,
where Ati = t
i
i t0i is rm Dis standalone incentive under market structure t = V; S, whileMSi is the
di¤erence between Dis standalone incentive and competitive incentive: M ti = (t
i
i  t0i )  (tbi   tji ) =
tbi   t0i . The R&D competition equilibrium under vertical structure t is consequently solved from
the following two FOCs:
t1 +M
t
1
t
2 = A
t
1
M t2
t
1 + 
t
2 = A
t
2
Closed-form solutions can be easily calculated as t1 =
At1 At2Mt1
2 Mt1Mt2 and 
t
2 =
At2 At1Mt2
2 Mt1Mt2 .
If the innovation is drastic, the competitive incentive is the same regardless of the innovator or
market structure: tbi   tji = P ti = P for i = 1; 2 and t = V; S. Then the equilibrium investment can
be rewritten as ti = 1  (   P ) ( M
t
i )
2 MtiMtj
. As a result, t  1  (1  t1)(1  t2) = 1  (   P )2ht,
where ht = ( M
t
1)( Mt2)
(2 Mt1Mt2)2 . Then, 
V < S if and only if hV > hS . Note that V2  1 requires
 MV2 . When  = MV2 , hV = 0 whereas hS > 0, so hV < hS , meaning that V > S .
Note that the equilibrium under V S is symmetric: MS1 = M
S
2 = M
S , so hS = ( M
S
1 )( MS2 )
(2 MS1 MS2 )
2 =
1
(+MS)2
. It can be shown that hV   hS has the same sign as a cubical function in , where the
coe¢ cient of 3 is 2MS MV1  MV2 . Because the innovation is drastic, the post-innovation outcome
is the same under both V I and V S, so 2MS MV1  MV2 = (V 01 +V 02 )  (S01 +S02). It can be shown
for both Bertrand and Cournot competition that V 01 +V
0
2 > S
0
1 +S
0
2 . Therefore, h
V  hS > 0 when
 is su¢ ciently large, and as a result V < S .
For non-drastic innovation, analytical comparison cannot be obtained. We resort to numerical
simulation and conrm the conclusion: V > S when  is small, and V < S when  is large.
Therefore, there exists a critical , below which vertical integration increases the industry rate of
innovation.
Appendix B
We consider the innovation incentive by the upstream rm under two di¤erent market structures,
vertical separation and vertical integration. We address the following question: under which vertical
market structure does the upstream rm have higher innovation incentive? Following the framework
in the previous sections, we consider the pure incentive to innovate. Specically, we compare the
incentives to innovate under vertical separation and vertical integration when only the upstream
rm conducts innovation.23 For simplicity and tractability, we assume the following linear demand
system in downstream competition: pi = a   qi   qj where  2 (0; 1) represents the degree of
product substitution.
Consider rst the case of vertical separation in which U0 supplies the input both downstream
rms at price w. Thus, U0 solves the following optimisation problem:
23We have also considered a setting as in Gilbert and Newsbery (1982) and found that a downstream rm has
higher incentive to innovate than the upstream rm.
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max
w
2 (w   c) q (w;w) .
To nd the optimal solution of w to the above problem, we rst solve the subgame of downstream
competition. In particular, given that U0 supplies the input at price w, downstream rm Di
maximises (a  qi   qj   w) qi. We can show that the quantity of input each downstream rm
demands in the symmetric equilibrium is
q (w;w) =
a  w
2 + 
.
Thus, given q (w;w) , U0s optimisation problem becomes
max
w
2 (w   c)

a  w
2 + 

.
The optimal solution to the above problem is
wS (c) =
a+ c
2
.
and U0 earns prot
S (c) =
(a  c)2
2 (2 + )
.
We next turn to the case of vertical integration in which U0 and D1 are vertically integrated.
In this case, U0 supplies D1 (internally) at cost c but charges price w2 to D2. Thus, U0 solves the
following optimisation problem:
max
w2
(w2   c) q (w2; c) +  (c; w2) .
We can show that the prot for integrating rm is
I (c) =
(2  ) (6  )
4
 
8  32 (a  c)2 .
Now, we are in a position to examine the innovation incentive under two di¤erent vertical
market structures. Note that the e¤ects of a reduction of input cost (from c to c d) on innovation
incentive under vertical separation and vertical integration are, respectively,
S0 (c  d)  S0 (c) = 1
2 (2 + )
h
(a  c+ d)2   (a  c)2
i
and
V0 (c  d)  V0 (c) = (2  ) (6  )
4
 
8  32
h
(a  c+ d)2   (a  c)2
i
.
Since
(2  ) (6  )
2
 
8  32   12 +  = 12  4 + 3 + 8( + 2)  8  32 > 0,
we have the following result, similar to that of Chen and Sappington (2010).
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Proposition 6. Under linear demand system and quadratic R&D cost function, the upstream
rm has a higher incentive to innovate under vertical integration than under vertical separation:
V0 (c  d)  V0 (c) > S0 (c  d)  S0 (c) .
To understand the result, it is worth noting the following points. First, note that in this up-
stream R&D setting, there is no market structure change following innovation: after the innovation
by the upstream rm, the market structure remains V S (V I) if it was V S (V I) before R&D.
This contrasts with the case of downstream R&D under V S, where the innovation transforms the
industry to V I. In other words, for upstream R&D, there is no structural benet to the innova-
tor. Second, in this upstream R&D setting, the replacement e¤ect of R&D exists under both V I
and V S: as the upstream rm innovates, it replaces the original prot regardless of the market
structure. Third, there are positive externalities associated with R&D here: as the upstream rm
innovates, both downstream rms benet as the input price goes down. This positive externality
is partially internalised under V I, but not under V S. Hence, the R&D incentive of the upstream
rm is greater under V I than under V S.
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